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Abstract European integration is based upon the promise to bring prosperity by
creating economic and social equilibrium among member states and its regions via
integrationist policies jointly managed by states and the institutions of the EU. As
one common market initiative for greater economic integration in the wider region,
goods circulate without tariff and customs duty barriers in the EU’s common cus-
toms area. Turkey, not an EU member, has been in this common market since 1996.
The EU-Turkey Customs Union, which promised to bring deeper economic and
political integration through eventual Turkish membership, represents Turkey’s
aspirations to move from the periphery of Europe into its core. As an anthropo-
logical contribution to investigations of advanced European capitalism, this paper
examines fundamental conflicts of interest between the EU and Turkey and locates
them in their unequal power relations and in the disjuncture of each side’s overall
objectives from economic integration. Most importantly, it shows that these interest
conflicts have ramifications at the individual bureaucratic level and in daily
bureaucratic practice. Dramatic expressions of Turkish state power, which are ini-
tially geared toward balancing out power inequities, exacerbate Turkish and EU
officials’ failures to maintain at least a facade of mutually sustainable interests.
Interpreted by EU officials as Turkish bureaucratic inertia, such disintegration of
interests has implications for ongoing economic integration and membership
negotiations between the two parties, with Turkish officials experiencing loss of
control. The paper calls for a critical political economy that pays due attention to the
cultural settings in which the former is embedded.
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Introduction
European integration is reputedly based on a promise to bring prosperity and wealth
to the wider region by creating economic and social equilibrium among states via
integrationist policies. Part of the European Union’s (EU) promise in bringing
prosperity to member states is to bring political stability and capitalist dynamism
into the European peripheries. The promise of peripheral development, however, is
at odds with much of the critical literature on economic change, which asserts, for
example, that the capitalist world-system and its regions are inevitably divided into
core and peripheral regions with unequal wealth, access to capital and technologies,
levels of development of labor power, and so forth. At the same time, it leaves open
what its consequences will be for different groups in the Euro periphery if regional
integration, as promised, brings wealth there. At a more essential level, the promise
inherent in European integration does not account for how power over political
economic processes and the policies that are embedded within them will be
distributed between the core and the periphery, and within the periphery itself, and
particularly the role of culture and cultural practices in reproducing power relations.
This paper investigates the case of the EU-Turkey Customs Union within the
context of Turkey’s ongoing accession to the EU since 2005. The EU-Turkey
Customs Union constitutes a significant moment in Turkey’s recasting of its
ambitions in the capitalist world-system, from a large and relatively powerful
semiperipheral country to a core country, as promised by the accession prospect.
Yet, once one looks into the deep processes of integration by which this recasting is
supposed to occur, one finds that bureaucratic encounters between two unequal
sides, both representing competing ‘‘constituencies’’—one of the European core,
one of a peripheral player—contain different interests that are reflected in different
cultural practices that may actually impede progress. After reviewing some of the
documentary evidence about how the integration process is managed between the
EU and Turkey, this study then examines ethnographically how unequal and
competing political economic interests are reflected in and reinforced by bureau-
cratic cultures and practices.
Customs regimes are directly related to a state’s economic and political
sovereignty, in terms of its ability to freely make economic policies in its territory.
Not only are customs a source of revenues but also a way to eliminate outside
competition for a state’s economic claimants (Tilly 1985:181). With respect to the
ongoing regionalization in Europe, EU member states increasingly share political
economic sovereignties with EU institutions, most notably with the European
Commission (EC). As the EU has become more of an economic zone with its own
common internal market (Wolters 2001; Malaby 2002; Rosamond 2002; Reinhardt
2004), economic and other sovereignties are pooled (Sassen 1996; Keohane 2002).
A common customs regime is an essential part of the EU’s move toward becoming
more like a supranational state. As part of a worldwide trend in global convergence
and standardization of customs rules (Chalfin 2010:29, 163–191), the EU (through
the Commission) became the sole authority in this area, not by directly collecting
taxes as classical states do (Sassen 2006) but by instituting and managing a customs
regime that is common to all EU member states. The EU-Turkey Customs Union
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represents Turkey’s aspirations to join in this pool of European sovereignties and its
acceptance of the core EU claim that doing so is in the joint self-interests of core
and peripheral states alike.
In order to get to the root of these processes, however, one must account for the
contradictions that are inherent in regional/global integration. One common
approach is conventional world-systems analysis, which proposes that the capitalist
world-system is made up of a single axial division of labor that reproduces global
and regional inequality among regions of the core, periphery, and semiperiphery
(Turkey, like the recent EU accession countries, being a clear member of the last
category). Put simply, that system was produced and is reproduced by processes of
incorporation and peripheralization, wherein regions or countries are subject to the
imposition of core-oriented political, financial, and material infrastructures;
economic units of production and distribution; and labor relations. Under such
conditions, upward mobility, as is promised to its peripheries by EU integration, is
highly unlikely. To the extent that it occurs, it will mainly help a small group of
elites whose interests are tied with those of core European capital.1
While this may oversimplify the world-systems approach, many critics from
sociology (Arrighi 1994; Burawoy et al. 2000; O’Hearn 2001; Bunker and
Ciccantell 2005; Tomich 2003) and anthropology (Kearney 1995; Tsing 2000;
Roseberry 2002; Wolf 1992) have proposed that the totality of the world-system can
only be understood if it is studied as a relational phenomenon where research and
analysis expose the linkages and mutually constituting interactions, that is, the
dialectics, between the local and the global. In the words of Roseberry (2002:64):
Institutions, powers, agencies, resources, and resistances will always neces-
sarily be locally figured (again, at both ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘periphery’’ locations), and
this is why any attempt to understand such dynamics solely or primarily in
terms of the ‘‘system’’ or the relationship of ‘‘periphery’’ to ‘‘core’’ will always
fail. Thus, ethnography, understood here as the attempt to understand a local
configuration of relationships and understandings, powers, and resistances, is
necessary to any understanding of the making of the modern world. Because
local relations are also embedded within accumulation processes of wider
scope, however, the definition of significant local actors, relations and
understandings must make those wider processes and relations internal to their
conception of the local. For such understandings, a flexible concept of the
social field—one that stresses context, that traces networks, and that defines its
central terms and units (including the ‘‘local’’ and the ‘‘global’’) as relations
rather than essences—is necessary.
Roseberry emphasizes the importance of employing ethnographic methods to
uncover processes and interest relations that lead to the concurrent formation and
reformation of local–global relations at every level. In other words, to fully
understand how relations are produced and reproduced, and the interests that
underlie those processes, it is important to observe the daily interactions of actors
1 The literature on world-systems analysis and its processes of incorporation and peripheralization is vast.
For a useful summary, see Wallerstein (2004).
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who are involved in them. Here, ethnography, along with documentary and other
data, is a key resource of critical political economy because it helps us understand
how the interests of core and peripheral actors are realized or blocked.
An ethnographic approach to the critical political economy of the EU-Turkey
relations that culminated in the common customs arrangements suggests that
hegemony is negotiated in a bureaucratic political configuration, where resistance
from the periphery to core hegemony is palpable in the wider European region. But
a proper account of the critical political economy of the EU-Turkey economic
integration cannot be attained if scholars insist on the arbitrary agenda of seeing
political economy devoid of political culture, and political culture insular from
political economy, much like Chalfin’s (2010:44) following prognosis:
A fully anthropological approach to the state equally recognizes that
sovereignty is deeply entangled culturally as well as socially and involves
the production of meaning and ways of being and knowing. Such a cultural
orientation offers an important alternative to more strictly political economic
approaches which privilege the instrumental over the experiential dimensions
of state authority and hence fail to address the fundamentally ideological
character of sovereign power and its transformation.
Unlike Chalfin, and following Polanyi (1957) and Hopkins (1957), I contend that a
critical analytical account of power should focus on the embedded relationship
between political economy and (political) culture (also see Hertz 1998 for a similar
argument).
Many students of European integration used the transnational encounters of
people who manage the everyday running of the EU’s techno-bureaucracy as a
‘‘laboratory’’ to study the localized trajectories of global/regional integration, to see
whether an emergent ‘‘common European interest’’ (Bellier 2000:56; Abe´le`s 2000)
could replace national identities, interests, and preferences. In today’s Europe,
common interest formation in many areas of life is largely enabled by the EU’s
gigantic techno-bureaucracy, which anthropologists and ethnographers have long
studied. Studying the role of policy-workers such as bureaucrats and consultants in
policy processes, some anthropologists suggested that researchers focus on the
‘‘ritual[s] and [the] production of meaning’’ in these processes ‘‘rather than [the]
production of effective policies per se’’ (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2001:17). For
others, bureaucracy is as ‘‘an emotive domain’’ that ‘‘produces and incites specific
modes of affectivity in its own right’’ (Navaro-Yashin 2006:182; also see Herzfeld
1992; Graham 2002; Alexander 2002 and Stoler 2004). In both cases, bureaucrats,
consultants, and other policymakers are viewed primarily as meaning-producing
actors and agents, thereby cultural performers, ‘‘whose product should not be judged
in terms of its supposed practical ends’’ (Stirrat 2000:43; see Herzfeld 1992 for an
original contribution along similar lines).
Yet, scholars tend to think of the work of public officials, the end result of their
work, and the social contexts within which they come to work, as independent
phenomena. This wrongly suggests that the bureaucratic domain is insular from
other realms of economic and political life and a place where legitimacy emanates
from within. In fact, it is imperative to study the symbolic dimension of bureaucratic
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work (done by bureaucrats or by others) and the practical policy results of such
work at the same time. This is simply because if bureaucrats act as cultural actors,
then they act in a cultural environment, which ultimately shapes and is shaped by
their actions. Just as Polanyi (1957) and Hopkins (1957) argued that economic
actions are embedded in social life, so too are bureaucratic and political actors and
institutions. More importantly, if bureaucratic actions are taken as independent of
their environment (i.e., their immediate and wider bureaucratic culture), it becomes
impossible to establish accountability. Yet again, it is important not to take these
wider bureaucratic cultures at face value but to contextualize their dynamic natures.
Here, unequal power relations between Turkey and the EU, I argue, inform not only
bureaucrats’ encounters with each other, but also their own policy work, wherein
Turkish officials demand collocution and immediate and equal representation, and
the Commission officials deny their demands due to the ways in which the EU
negotiates with candidate countries, and also because of the two sides’ competing
political economic interests.
For those who take bureaucracy as a social institution, ‘‘an understanding of
bureaucratic work requires the analysis of social relationships between officials,
between officials and clients, and of more inclusive social fields within which
contacts and relationships are played out’’ (Handelman 1978:9).2 The following
discussion on the social relationships of Turkish and EU officials suggests that such
relationships are both constituted by and constituting bureaucratic actors’ capacity
to bring outside and in-group influences into their encounters with counterparts from
the supranational level. As in every political act of instituting, their ways of doing
this have manifest and latent symbolic qualities, not least the rites and rituals of
institutions (Bourdieu 1996, 1999). In pointing to the relationship between power
and its dramatic manifestations, Cohen (1980:66) suggested that ‘‘ordinary symbolic
performances as a dancing ball, a university graduation ceremony, a funeral service
or a wedding festivity repetitively reproduce or modify power relations’’ (also see
Kertzer 1988). Following these strands of scholarly inquiry, I take bureaucratic
encounters between officials who are party to the EU-Turkey Customs Union as
symbolic performances that are also constitutive of cultural and political relations in
negotiations of economic integration, and thus in return heavily influence those
economic negotiations and the definition of economic interests of both sides. Due to
failed promises of political integration and discomfort with the existing provisions
of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, Turkish politicians, officials, and businessmen
are looking for other ways and means to broaden their space for political maneuver
and their capacity to regaining political economic sovereignty vis-a`-vis the EU.
Close encounters of officials within this framework carry unique insights into the
actually lived process of interest formation and the day-by-day development of what
matters most in the EU/Turkey agenda.
2 For anthropological and other ethnographic studies of the EU-building that paid special attention to
Eurocratic encounters between officials from national governments and the EU institutions whether they
took place in Brussels or in EU member states, see Abe´le`s (1992); Abe´le`s et al. (1993); Bellier (2000,
2002a, b); Geuijen et al. (2007, 2008); McDonald (1996, 2000); Muntigl et al. (2000); Shore (2000, 2002,
2007); Shore and Black (1994); Shore and Baratieri (2006), Thedvall (2006, 2007); Wodak (2009).
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When the EU-Turkey Customs Union was first envisioned in the 1960s, the idea of
political regionalization in Europe was less pronounced than today. By the time it
went into operation in 1996, European economic integration coupled with political
consolidation in the wider region was already experiencing its second coming with
the fifth enlargement of the EU and the accession of former socialist countries. At
that time, Turkey had been experimenting with free market mechanisms for over a
decade, having launched a transition from protectionism to export-oriented
industrialization in the early 1980s. After more than 15 years in existence, however,
the Customs Union faces acute problems. I argue that these problems are due to
growing frictions between Turkey and the EU, which correspond to discords in
forming common economic and political interests in a number of areas of
cooperation. As communicated to me by EU and Turkish officials entrusted with
facilitating the customs regime, discussed in great detail below, the Custom Union’s
apparent mismanagement and distortions are a manifestation of a disjuncture in the
formation of common interests regarding the overall objectives of economic
integration between Turkey and the Union, a disjuncture that is marked by unequal
power relations. As a result, dramatic expressions of state power have entered this
process, especially from the Turkish side, in order to remedy (or cover up) its
perceived power deficit with respect to the EU. Such bureaucratic dramas exacerbate
Turkish officials’ disintegration from joint agreements with their EU counterparts.
Appearing as bureaucratic inertia, such disintegration effects have implications for
membership talks, with the Turkish officials at individual and collective bureaucratic
levels experiencing loss of control during negotiations with EU officials. As can be
traced from transnational day-to-day encounters of techno-bureaucrats working on
customs issues, this process in turn put the future of economic integration at risk.
Economic gains and political losses: introducing the EU-Turkey Customs
Union
In 1951, European leaders brought together French coal and German steel—along
with four other western European countries—to establish the European Coal and
Steel Community. They thus instituted economic cooperation as a model for
resolving political feuds that resulted in two devastating wars in the region and
beyond. As part of a long-standing common market initiative for greater economic
integration in the wider region, they then established an economic community in
1957 with the Treaty of Rome. Emphasis on ‘‘community’’ was more pronounced
than in economic cooperation models that existed elsewhere. Partially modeled
upon the German Zollverein (see Henderson 1981), the Treaty of Rome prescribed a
common customs union whereby processed goods could circulate among member
states without tariff and customs duty barriers. Today, 31 countries participate in the
European Customs Union, including 27 EU member states plus Andorra, San
Marino, Monaco, and Turkey.
The biggest economic benefit from participating in the common internal market
is the ability of a member state to trade freely within the area as long as it observes
common rules. The biggest disadvantage is that it cannot protect its producers from
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outside competition, particularly from giant core EU companies or from US and
other transnationals producing in or exporting to the EU. Turkey has been in an
awkward position since it signed an agreement of customs union with EU member
states in 1996. It remains the only country that entered the Union before it even
acquired candidacy for EU membership, which came in 1999 (Eder 2001:33). Since
1996, trade between EU countries and Turkey is free of duties and tariffs, and all
apply common tariffs on imports from third countries. The customs union mandates
free movement of industrial goods and processed agricultural goods between
Turkey and the EU by eliminating customs duties and quotas; products such as non-
processed agricultural goods and steel are exempt but are covered by separate
agreements. This provision of ‘‘no customs on industrial and processed agricultural
goods’’ covers goods that are wholly produced in Turkey or in the EU but also those
that are imported from third countries and reexported after being processed in
Turkey or in the EU.3 Customs union thus means a comprehensive regime of
internal economic ‘‘deregulation’’ whereby the EU effectively regulates a partic-
ipating country’s economic and social policies on labor and employment,
intellectual property rights, and so on.
The establishment of competition rules, common trading policy, and the
conclusion of international agreements are issues on which common EU decisions
prevail over the interests of individual member states. Such common decisions are
initiated by the European Commission, the executive body of the EU, and are then
negotiated in the European Council and European Parliament. When the Turkish
government hired lobbyists from prominent global public relations companies to run
a campaign for a EU-Turkey Customs Union in Brussels, it aimed for a greater, yet
distant goal: full EU membership.4 Consultants from the Brussels office of the New
York-based Hill and Knowlton successfully reached out to members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) and EU member governments via their representatives
in the Council, in order to show that the Turkey-EU customs union was ‘‘safe’’ for
Europe.5 At the time, EU parties such as the German Christian-Democrats supported
Turkey, contemplating that customs union would be enough. Yet, their Turkish
counterparts hoped for more (see Kramer 1996). Following ratification of the
customs union by the European and Turkish parliaments, Turkish school children
received the good news as the voice of their schoolmasters poured from classroom
speakers: ‘‘As of today [1 January 1996] our country has entered into a customs
union with the EU. Congratulations to our nation. May it bring prosperity to all of
us!’’
3 See, DG TAXUD—Turkey: Customs Unions and preferential arrangements—General introduction,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/customs_unions/article_414_
en.htm.
4 Interviews with a consultant (March 13, 2009, Brussels) and a former trainee (June 2, 2009, Brussels)
from Hill and Knowlton, both of who had worked on the Turkey-EU customs union campaign at the time.
The Turkish government had hired another lobbying company in Washington to lobby the US
government in order to get them lobby the EU publics. The Turkish government’s efforts resulted in the
US Mission to the EU in Brussels and US embassies in big member states mobilizing their support at the
EU level.
5 Interview with a Hill and Knowlton consultant (March 13, 2009, Brussels).
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Fifteen years later, the European Commission asserts that Turkey has greatly
benefitted from the customs union:
Turkey has benefited from an ‘‘early’’ legislative alignment process before its
accession negotiations started. Turkey is participating in the EU single market
for goods. Turkey has been implementing a EU-aligned anti-trust legislation
for 10 years. Turkey has benefited from an almost EU-aligned customs
legislation for 10 years. Turkish exporters are experienced in manufacturing
according to EU technical standards. Turkey has adopted and implemented
many intellectual property rights.6
Indeed, for some Turkish manufacturers, customs union meant that their washing
machines marched into EU markets. The trade volume between Turkey and the EU
in 2009 was more than five times that of 1995. Meanwhile, between 1996 and 2009,
the share of agriculture and of textiles and clothing in Turkish exports to the EU fell
by half, while the share of automotive sector, machinery, and iron and steel
increased five-, three- and two-fold, respectively. In 2009, 75 % of Turkey’s
automotive exports, 69 % of textile and clothing exports, 54 % of electronic
equipment exports, and 51 % of machinery exports were directed at the EU. The
main European export destinations from Turkey in 2009 were Germany, France,
UK, Italy, and Spain, while Turkey’s main EU import partners were Germany, Italy,
France, Spain, and the UK (in decreasing order of export and import volumes).7 In
2010, the EU accounted for 46 % of total Turkish export and 40 % of total import
volumes.8 Trade volumes always provide favorable figures for those who support
Turkish membership in the EU. But they do not address issues of developmental
imbalance where, for example, a high proportion of Turkish machine exports are
reexports by transnational corporations of parts and materials that were imported
into and assembled in Turkey (Yilmaz 2007:246). Such trade quadrupled in the last
30 years as the country moved away from import substitution (Kirisci and
Kaptanoglu 2011:705).
The growing share of manufactured goods in Turkey’s exports led some analysts
to acclaim the country as ‘‘Europe’s BRIC’’ or ‘‘the China of Europe’’ (The
Economist, 21 October 2010). Yet, from the Turkish perspective, the Customs
Union strikes many as a failed experience, particularly because of inequalities
between EU member states and Turkey in economic development, hence, in market
competitiveness. A medium-sized Turkish businessman explained to me his
frustration with the existing parameters of the customs union in the following way:
They [potential buyers from certain sectors in the EU] come to us and tell us to
produce such and such product according to such and such regulations and
6 http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Gumruk_Birligi.html.
7 See ‘‘Trade Relations between Turkey and the EC,’’ prepared by the Directorate-General for European
Affairs, Undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade. Online available at
http://www.dtm.gov.tr/dtmadmin/upload/AB/ABKurumsalDb/trade.doc.
8 See ‘‘Turkey-EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World,’’ prepared by the Directorate-General for
Trade (DG TRADE) of the European Commission, March 21, 2012. Online available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/113456.htm.
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product model. They tell us how much they will pay us for the product. They
dictate their own experts as controllers during the production process. They
even demand their own trucks to transport the finished products to designated
addresses in the EU. There is greater industrial production in the EU but no
one to drive the trucks [to transport goods around]. For the EU, Turkey is the
Near East [compared to China being Far East]. They need human labor;
skilled human labor; labor of those who are like them.9
On the other hand, big businessmen in Turkey seem to enjoy being called the China
of Europe for the exact reasons that upset this businessman, that is, in hopes of
attracting more foreign investment.10
Even from the beginning, however, customs union with the EU meant more than
simple regulatory changes and short-term economic benefits for Turkish political and
bureaucratic elites and the bourgeoisie. It meant a step toward EU membership,
which they valued very highly. Membership would enable them to participate in EU
decision making about economic matters that have regional and global reach.
Turkish elites, who ratified the customs union agreement despite strong domestic
dissent, often couched as anti-globalization sentiments (Eder 2001; U¨lgen 2006;
U¨lgen and Zahariadis 2004; Yilmaz 2007), argued that further economic integration
with the EU could bring eventual political union. Once the customs union agreement
was in place, they said, the famous ‘‘spillover’’ effect would kick in and complete the
job. Major theories, projections, and promises of EU integration pointed this way. As
Ernst Haas, one of the ideologues of European integration, once suggested, ‘‘the
essence of supranationality lies in the tendency for economic and social decisions to
‘spill over’ into the realm of the political, to arise from and further influence the
political aspirations of the major groupings and parties in democratic societies’’
(1964:65). Partially in justifying the supranational decision making whereby national
sovereignty is pooled into a supranational governance system as a result of economic
globalization (Sassen 1996; Keohane 2002; also see Ong 2000 for pooling of
sovereignties in extra-European spaces), Haas (1964:65) further contended that ‘‘the
indirect penetration of the political by way of the economic’’ is a necessary evil
because ‘‘the ‘purely’ economic decisions always require political significance in the
minds of participants.’’ Today, the EU-Turkey Customs Union is still in place, but
expectations from the Turkish side on using it as a means for pushing EU leaders to
grant full participation in the legislative and political life of the EU have waned,
along with the necessary collegiality from the EU side such an act would require.11
9 Personal communication with a chemical engineer working in the pharmaceuticals sector (September
20, 2010, Istanbul).
10 Sureyya Ciliv, the CEO of Turkcell, and Tugrul Kutadgobilik, the chairman of the Turkish
Confederation of Employer Associations (TISK) both speaking at the ‘‘Opportunity of Enlargement to
Europe: Turkey,’’ a working session organized by Turkcell during the European Business Summit held on
March 26, 2009 in Brussels.
11 From a statistical perspective, Turkey’s foreign trade with the EU seems in gradual decline, but this is
due to the global financial crisis (Kirisci and Kaptanoglu 2011:715). Nevertheless, Turkish businessmen
are now also eyeing on alternative markets in neighboring regions such as in Africa and the Middle East,
and in Russia, with their politicians helping them by brokering politically favorable business
environments.
Failed promises
123
Frictions in common interests and the problem of representation
In recent years, Turkey and the Commission have quietly raised objections regarding
existing provisions of the customs union. According to the terms set by these two
parties in 1996, Turkey agreed to join the already existent common customs area.
This simple legal fact, however, is not so simple in the world of political economy,
including the European economic zone, where national interests still cause great
discord, conflict, and bureaucratic battles between parties to this common regime.
The Turkish side claims that when the Commission on behalf of EU member
states signs free trade agreements (FTAs) with third countries, they must
individually sign similar FTAs with Turkey (which they are usually reluctant to
do) in order for the EU-Turkey Customs Union to apply to these countries. An FTA
is a legal economic framework under which ‘‘two or more countries minimally
agree to eliminate tariffs, quotas, and preferences on most traded goods. Most FTAs
today also seek to liberalize trade in services, investment, and numerous other
regulated areas of economic activity. At the same time, members of an FTA
maintain their own tariffs, quotas, and other non-tariff barriers vis-a`-vis non-
members’’ (Ahearn 2011:1, n.1). Hence, when goods from third countries enter the
Turkish market without paying any customs duties, the same does not automatically
hold for Turkish exports. Turkish representatives to the Customs Union Joint
Committee (CUJC)12 meetings held in 2008 and 2009 repeatedly asked the
Commission to consider Turkey’s interests and to inform Turks about common EU
positions before and after the signing of new FTAs with third countries (U¨lgen and
Zahariadis 2004:7–8).
During the 20th CUJC meeting—as the representative of Turkey’s most powerful
business lobby then based in Brussels reported—the Commission representatives
stated that Turkish representatives of public interests could participate in relevant
committees and working groups when and if Turkey harmonizes its laws according
to the Commission directives on the relevant area; participation in comitology
committees (see below) is not possible when neither full harmonization nor
membership is in sight (TUSIAD 2008a:10, b). A year later, the Turkish side
brought FTAs onto the joint committee meeting’s agenda once again. This time, the
Turkish delegation asked the Commission to make sure that the existing and
upcoming FTAs with third countries covered Turkey, too. They recommended that
the Commission add a ‘‘Turkey clause’’ to future FTAs.13 Otherwise, they claimed,
12 The customs union agreement went into force on July 1, 1996, upon ratification in the national
parliaments of EU members and Turkey. A committee to ensure its proper functioning was subsequently
established. The EC-Turkey Customs Union Joint Committee (CUJC) thus provides a common platform
for officials from both sides to meet regularly and discuss issues directly pertaining to the technical
functioning of the customs union. Cochaired by one representative from each side, the CUJC now meets
once in six months, although it was initially envisaged to meet once a month. These meetings are
exclusive gatherings with restricted access. Here, I rely on minutes of the meetings kept by a consultant
based in Brussels who regularly attends on behalf of Turkey’s main representative body of big business.
13 U¨lgen and Zahariadis (2004:9) noted that the Commission invoked such a clause in the draft free trade
agreement with Vietnam. But the issue remained unresolved since the matter repeatedly came up in
subsequent CUJC meetings as we learn from the minutes of meetings from 2008 and 2009 to which I refer
here.
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Turkey would take necessary measures to protect itself. The Commission responded
that, although any FTA the EU signs with third countries are by default extended to
include Andorra and San Marino, Turkey is a major competitive power unlike these
two countries and that the EU cannot negotiate FTAs on behalf of Turkey with third
countries within the exiting institutional structure, that is, without Turkey’s EU
membership (TUSIAD 2010:1).
In fact, until Turkish EU membership is finalized, companies from both sides
trade in uncharted territory. When Turkey takes measures to ‘‘protect its interests’’
by curbing access of non-Turkish companies to its markets, these companies go to
the permanent representatives of their originating country in Brussels and to the
Commission to raise complaints. When Turkish companies experience restrictions
in doing business in EU member states, however, they cannot do the same. Even
when they go to the Commission, which they often do, it advises them to take their
case directly to the governments of EU member states involved in the dispute.14
The Commission is in an awkward position vis-a`-vis Turkey with regard to its
representation of EU member states and its brokerage of common interests between
them and candidate states. Minutes of the CUJC meetings attest that Turks
continuously try to get the Commission to represent them—as if it is a state agency
of either Turkey or the EU—by demanding that it act as a go-between for Turkey,
EU member states, and third countries. Such calls are not always rejected outright,
and the Commissioners could help solve such matters for candidate countries. But
this is exactly the moment when a seemingly simple technical matter of economic
loss turns into a matter of political representation, which requires the Commission to
act on Turkey’s behalf as a result of its political demands.
The main fault line of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is political. Usual EU
practice suggests that candidate countries enter a customs union with the EU after
they become Union members, that is, political integration precedes economic
integration. But the Turkish case is an anomaly because a customs union did not
lead to political integration in the form of EU membership. One critic described the
EU-Turkey Customs Union agreement as ‘‘living in sin’’ (Peers 1996). Not only did
enhanced economic relations not spill over into the political domain, failed
experiences in economic integration actually smothered hopes for the possibility of
political integration in any near future. In return, some negatively affected groups
(mainly from Turkey) began circulating rumors that put into question the overall
benefit of remaining in the customs union.
From the Commission’s perspective, the customs union brings both rights and
obligations. In particular, Turkey was expected to make a number of changes to its
trade and technical laws in order to harmonize with EU legislation. This became a
problem. According to an EU official who has first-hand access and knowledge,
Turkish authorities were arguably not encouraged by a number of other factors
that negatively affected their ability to effectively align their technical
legislation with the EU’s. For political reasons the EU, which had taken more
than a year to communicate the list of instruments to Turkey, did not deliver
14 Interview with a Commission official (March 19, 2009, Brussels).
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the aid announced as part of political deal surrounding the CU [customs
union], whereas Turkey lacked expertise and needed technical assistance to
adopt, implement and enforce acquis-compatible legislation. (Misrahi
2010:196)
This should not come as a surprise, however, when even the EU’s common law (the
acquis communautaire) itself becomes at times a means for politicization in Turkey-
EU relations.
In the final analysis, the customs union envisages a comprehensive framework for
Turkey’s trade relations and economic policies. Without ‘‘enjoying’’ full partici-
pation in the decision making of these policies due to lack of EU membership,
Turkey tries to protect its economic interests by requiring duplicate procedures for
imports that are already certified in Turkey/EU trade or by putting restrictions on
imports of goods from third countries that are in free circulation in Turkey/EU (for a
discussion of some of these trade restrictions, see Misrahi 2009). A decade into the
customs union, one of its negotiators complained that,
Turkey continues to lack the technical capacity and infrastructure to fully meet
the needs of the testing and certification process. The most serious problems
appear to be concentrated in the crucial areas of metrology and calibration,
quality certification and laboratory testing. Such lack of infrastructure in turn
translates into a lack of confidence in Turkish processes and procedures. In
effect, the resulting burden for Turkish exporters has become significant, as
they need to certify their products with foreign laboratories and institutes,
which in turn means increased transport and other administrative costs. (U¨lgen
and Zahariadis 2004:16)
Soon after, Turkish authorities began to request similar certificates in order for the
EU products to enter into the Turkish market. Technically,
these certificates attest to the conformity of products originating in a member
state or [a partner country] to the legislation applicable to that product.
Between the EU and a third country … the recognition of such certificates
means that, when the certified product exported by a member state or [a third
country] reaches the [third country] or member state of destination, it should
not be subject to double testing, unless the country of origin has serious doubts
as to the products safety … [because otherwise] market access risked being
impaired due to non-recognition of conformity certificates. (Misrahi
2010:190)
In the absence of trust and confidence—a theme run amok in recent relations
between Turkey and the EU manifest in many policy fields—both parties use
‘‘technical’’ means to protect their interests (COM(2009)533 (SEC(2009)1334):5;
U¨lgen and Zahariadis 2004:14), even when it may dilute the customs union by not
implementing it in full capacity and thus going against the spirit of customs union,
bilateral trade agreements, and trustworthy partnership.15
15 Interview with two Commission officials from DG AGRI (April 9, 2008, Brussels).
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The establishment of mutual trust and confidence, however, are cultural matters.
The apparent distortions and mismanagement in the EU-Turkey Customs Union,
manifested as latent economic protectionism in trade relations, can thus be
interpreted as a means for both sides to manage the political and economic costs
associated with Turkey’s EU accession process (Misrahi 2010). Such protectionism
is not only observable in economic or political terms. It has important implications
at the personal bureaucratic level, manifest in the cultural behavior of the very
actors and agents of this process. So, let us examine such behavior and practices.
Short-range passes on a narrow field: bureaucratic encounters
within the framework of the EU-Turkey Customs Union
The Commission has been an active engineer, negotiator, and promoter of a common
European identity-interest (Laffan 1996, 2004; Shore 2000). Economic frameworks
such as customs unions that engender greater integration in policy toward third
countries are a means through which common interests are formed and operate.
According to March and Olsen (1998:967), the EU provides ‘‘numerous arenas for
interaction, argumentation, and collective problem solving and conflict resolution for
bureaucrats, experts, representatives of organized interests, and elected politicians.’’
Embedded in this learning process is a socialization effect, whereby such meetings
provide fertile ground for common European understandings to emerge during policy
processes wherein participants are exposed ‘‘to new arguments, new perspectives,
and new identities,’’ and whereby they develop ‘‘capabilities for mutual engage-
ment’’ (March and Olsen 1998:967). Therefore, in such meeting settings,
considerable experience with acting together is accumulated, and a significant
amount of mutual influence between the EU and domestic institutions and
actors is taking place, with no clear-cut borderline between the ‘‘national’’
and the ‘‘European.’’ The number of meetings in the context of the EU,
together with meetings in the context of other international institutions, during
some periods actually makes ministers, bureaucrats, and experts interact as
much with colleagues from other countries as with their domestic colleagues.
(March and Olsen 1998:967)
One common depiction of Europeanization in political science, sociology, and
anthropology is to regard such socialization effects as ‘‘national adaption’’
(Harmsen and Wilson 2000:14). According to this common definition, European-
ization as national adaption refers to a process through which ‘‘EU institutions and
politics affect member states’ institutions and policies’’ (Beyers and Trondal
2004:919; also Kassim et al. 2000, 2001; for a critique, see Harmsen 1999). Defined
in this way, Europeanization cum socialization at the supranational level can also
work as ‘‘an ‘action trap’ in which agents, once set on a specific course of action,
find themselves obliged to take a set of further actions that point them in a direction
in which they did not necessarily intend to go’’ (Abe´le`s 2002:242).
Commission officials regularly meet with representatives of public and private
interest groups from candidate countries. To extend EU norms and values to
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candidate countries during the accession process, the Commission customarily
implies, expects, and at times demands that candidate country representatives
gradually become part of this working environment and adapt to its norms and
forms. In this regard, common interest formation can be a corresponding process to
socialization at the EU level, brought by the EU’s specific engagement with
candidate countries, which is more pedagogical than collegial in nature (Bellier
2004; Schmid 2004; Teivainen 2009). What follows is a thick account of
bureaucratic management of the negotiations of terms and conditions of the Turkey-
EU partnership in customs and other associated areas, which reveals the political
and cultural imagination of joint futures by both parties—or the conditions that
produce their absence. I describe bureaucratic encounters of officials from both
sides. The larger political economic context and its associated fissures that surround
such encounters by and large eclipsed bureaucratic work on the customs union and
ensuing cultural encounters between actor and participants. Yet, as I have argued,
the cultural–political framework has crucial impact on the creation of political
economic processes.
Within the framework of the EU-Turkey accession negotiations in which the
customs issues frequently figure, the Commission officials and their Turkish
counterparts encounter each other in various technical meetings, sometimes as
frequently as once a month. Turkish public officials attend accession meetings as
representatives of Turkish ‘‘national interests’’—however complex they may be
(Lewis 2009)—whereas the Commission team purportedly represents the ‘‘common
European interest’’ of 27 member states (Abe´le`s and Bellier 1996). The
Commission’s privileged role of initiating laws via Eurocratic input is crucial in
representing common community interest(s) during accession negotiations, espe-
cially because it has a vast pool of expertise and tactical maneuvers (Page
1997:154). The Customs Union Joint Committee meetings I mentioned above, for
example, are only one variant where intense negotiations of this sort take place. The
Turkey-EU common customs regime is part of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations
because candidates must fully comply with the legal provisions of customs union
under EU law for the accession process to proceed toward membership but also
because the common customs regime incorporates EU policies on taxation,
intellectual property rights, trade, and industrial policies, among others.
The Commission’s direct counterpart in Turkey is the government in Ankara.
When it negotiates with candidate countries, the Commission acts like the
‘‘government’’ of the EU, despite the fact that it is not a state in the classical
sense of the term (Shore 2006) and there is no ‘‘European citizenry’’ on whose
behalf such a super government could act (cf. De´loye 2000; Meehan 2000; Neveu
2000; Shore 2000). However, with its executive organ acting like a government
under legal mandate, especially during its dealing with third countries, the EU has
increasingly become a quasi-state, formed not by democratic but by techno-
bureaucratic politics.
Separate directorate generals in the Commission do daily business with their
Turkish counterparts from fifteen ministries and numerous state agencies. After
years of dealing with Turkey in the context of its smothered embryonic candidacy,
after attending numerous meetings with Turkish delegations, and after participating
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in missions and field trips,16 many Commission officials have a common assessment
of the Turkish bureaucracy. My interlocutors from the Commission’s 19 directorate
generals (39 Commission officials participated in this research) described Turkish
bureaucratic culture as hierarchically organized, wherein the organizational
hierarchy thickens as one moves upward. According to their observations, this
results in a vertically challenged communication between higher-ups and lower
level officials from either side. Over and over, my interlocutors from the
Commission suggested that there was a difference in their relations with Turkish
counterparts between formal (rigid, indirect, hierarchical, and procedural) commu-
nications and more informal (direct) ones. In terms of practicality, Commission
officials working on Turkey preferred to be in direct contact with their Turkish
counterparts from various ministries in Ankara. In Turkey, the responsible unit for
coordinating customs affairs is the Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade.
Accession negotiations are by and large coordinated by the recently instituted
Ministry of EU Affairs, which remains under the strong shadow of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Other agencies such as the Office of the Prime Minister and the
Ministry of Economy also often try to increase their voices in customs policies and
decision making.
The Commission officials from other directorate generals—which are known as
line units and function like regular ministries in national state systems though with
high number of expert officials among staff—are expected to pass their information
requests to the Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD), the
main Commission authority supervising the EU-Turkey Customs Union which also
organizes joint customs committee meetings. DG TAXUD refers all requests of
information, appeals, and complaints to Turkey’s official delegation to the EU in
Brussels, which follows the chain of hierarchy in bureaucratic communication
between the Turkish offices: from Turkey’s EU representation in Brussels, to the
foreign affairs ministry in Ankara, and only then to the respective line ministry. This
long chain increases time and energy spent on communicating between partners,
especially when official communication channels are not working properly due to
political competition between Turkish ministries and state agencies (Keskin 2002).
Equally, when some individual bureaucrats are sent to work at Turkey’s EU
representation in Brussels, they are stripped of their technocratic features and
become mere diplomat-bureaucrats, thus encountering a greater risk of being cutoff
from negotiations with the EU. To prove public ownership of the EU-Turkey
relations by various state offices and agencies, something demanded by Turkey’s
prime minister himself, resistance by some of these Turkish officials to otherwise
easing the Turkey-EU administrative communication is thus very meaningful: It
helps some officials to reemphasize their role in EU negotiations but most notably
their role in Turkey’s domestic bureaucratic politics.17
16 There are also those few who had been assigned to Turkey as seconded national experts by way of the
twinning program and other bilateral administrative cooperation schemes for short-term stays.
17 For a discussion of bureaucratic politics in terms of environmental policymaking within the framework
of Turkey’s EU accession, see Unalan and Cowell (2009).
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Meetings between Commission officials and their Turkish counterparts bring
about a mutual learning process. Over many years of accession negotiations,
participant–actors from both sides learned (and still learn) how to deal with each
other. Such learning cannot be thought outside a pedagogical framework with
emphasis on mutual learning and teaching wherein participants negotiate with each
other as much as they learn how to negotiate. Earlier in the long history of
institutionalization of Turkey-EU relations, the Turkish government sent high-level
officials to meetings with the Commission. This changed, however, once the
government realized that the primary objective of such meetings is simply to
exchange technical information.
Other than technical and sectoral meetings on the customs union, the Turkish and
Commission officials have numerous occasions to encounter one another during
comitology committees and the Commission’s working groups. There is a
comitology committee wherein FTA-related issues are talked about, and Turkey
wanted to be a party to this committee for reasons I discussed above. In EU jargon,
comitology committees refer to proto-decision making platforms that
assist the Commission in executing its implementing powers by giving an
opinion on draft implementing measures before they are adopted. They
include representatives from each EU country and are chaired by a
Commission official. They also act as a forum for discussions on implement-
ing measures, and a channel of communication between the Commission and
the national authorities.18
These comitology committee meetings are thus vital to attend for anyone who
has a stake in participating in the EU’s policy and decision making while ideas are
in formation. The Commission recently began inviting Turkey to some meetings as
an observer, especially those on automotive and textiles sectors, in which Turkey is
an important producer and exporter to the EU. But comitology work on different
aspects of Turkey’s EU accession is still very limited. Turkish representatives travel
to Brussels for these meetings without voting at the end on texts that carry the
Commission’s opinions. One Turkish official who worked in Brussels at the time of
our interview and who participated in one such meeting described it in the following
words:
It is like an intra-family meeting. You feel like you entered their bedroom.
Twenty-seven of them [member states’ representatives] sit in these meetings.
Twenty-seven [representatives] of the member states are speaking to each
other calmly and properly. It affects me a lot. They call each other Mr.
Germany, Ms. UK. They have a serious tradition of consensus and
cooperation. Twenty-seven people-states sit down and talk about issues down
to minute detail, and they talk openly/freely.19
18 See http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/index.cfm?do=FAQ.FAQ, accessed on December
15, 2011.
19 Interview with an official from the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU (May 29, 2009,
Brussels).
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A sort of embarrassment was triggered in this Turkish official’s immediate thoughts
and feelings as he encountered the EU bureaucracy. He felt like an outsider in a
place where he did not belong, as if the gathering was only for family members.
Here were two processes of othering operating in tandem: one side othering the EU
bureaucracy vis-a`-vis its own (Turkish) bureaucracy, and the other internally
othering the Turkish bureaucracy as the anti-character to itself (with the official’s
double reference to talking ‘‘calmly’’ and ‘‘openly’’).
Officials frequently use stereotypes when they talk about each other, stereotypes
that are refined by many years’ encounters. Such stereotypes as currencies of
cultural encounters prove bureaucracy to be a social institution. One such stereotype
was invoked by a British Commission official during our interview at his DG’s
cafeteria, as he described the culture of governing in Turkey. His account includes
both self- and other-portrayals. The account is comparative by default, for
comparativism is after all deeply embedded in the very logic of EU governance and
membership negotiations.
To compare the politics of bureaucracy and bargaining among and within EU
member states and candidate countries, the Commission official distinguished
between courtier and college systems.20 In the college system, various governmental
ministers sit around a table with their counterparts from the Commission and talk
about problems in a policy area. Each has an equal say. From this Commission
official’s almost stoic perspective, the main objective of this sort of meeting is ‘‘to
solve social and economic problems by way of public policy.’’ Officials attending
these meetings come up with working plans by means of mutual agreement. In the
college system—this official gave Germany as an example—there is ‘‘compromise’’
and ‘‘cooperation’’ for the common cause between governmental and political
actors. The courtier system, to the contrary, rests upon high concentration of power
and authority in individuals who sit at the top of the political structure. Elite
outsiders may manipulate the system, but they do not have a seat at the table.21
My Commission interlocutors en masse observed that the Turkish side attends
technical meetings as a crowd. The size of the Turkish delegation may vary, but no
less than 40–80 people are present in technical meetings held with the Commission,
representing all governmental ministries and state agencies that are involved in one
policy area, especially if the meeting is held in Turkey. Meetings with the
Commission constitute a learning experience for Turkish delegates, who may also
see these meetings as a rare opportunity to travel abroad. When meetings are held in
Brussels, they are welcomed by a smaller Commission delegation of about 5–6
officials.
During the meetings, group membership is clearly distinguishable; so are the
interests each group represents. According to which interests they represent,
officials take seats facing their counterparts from the rival team. This and other
Commission interlocutors suggested that candidate country representatives usually
20 Interview with a Commission official (May 25, 2009, Brussels).
21 ‘‘Courtier’’ is a term first used in the 14th-century Renaissance Italy to describe those ‘‘in attendance at
a royal court’’ and those ‘‘who practice flattery,’’ usually in order to get something or to win favors.
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary-Entry on Courtier, available http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/courtier. Accessed on August 25, 2010.
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have leeway to influence the atmosphere in which technical negotiations take place.
The sitting order gives clues about the ensuing style of negotiation and ultimately
the ‘‘culture of compromise’’ (Abe´le`s and Bellier 1996; Bellier 2000; also see Sideri
2005), or the lack thereof, between officials from both sides, something that my
Turkish interlocutors also mentioned.
Unlike Croatian Eurocrats, who tend to socialize during technical meetings,
Turkish officials sit together as if they are lining up for an upcoming battle or a penalty
kick in a football game.22 When asked to comment on different behaviors of Turkish
and Croatian bureaucrats, one Turkish official with two-year’s experience with the
Commission suggested that it is wrong to compare the two: ‘‘We [Turkish bureaucrats]
have a state tradition…. We would never buddy–buddy [kanka olmak] with the
Commission [as Croation officials do], even if Turkey might soon become a member
state.’’23 Of the seven Turkish officials based in Brussels (there are 26 in total) who
participated in this study, three explicitly referred to Turkey’s ‘‘state tradition’’ as the
main factor that impedes the country’s progress toward accession, and which
distinguishes it from other candidate countries. Trade negotiations are especially
significant in this context. A Spanish Commission official gave the following example
when we were discussing problems associated with trade negotiations over processed
agricultural goods that are covered by the customs union:
They [the Turkish government] don’t give me sellable arguments … You
don’t have to surrender, you find and accept a generous solution … stay calm
and concentrated; just give the data. Be cool in debates. [But] they [Turkish
officials] lose their temper. Don’t go to the poetical game, because you
[Turkish officials] are going to pay there! It’s not free of charge to get tomato
quotas; you [need to] give us fiscal data…. The Community is not a heaven;
consensus is not without a pay. Generosity, welfare… you [Turkey] need to
care about other(s); respect others with care.24
Clearly, from the perspective of this Commission bureaucrat, Turkish officials see
negotiations as an opportunity for ‘‘give-less and take-more,’’ without surrendering
points to the opposing team. Some Turkish officials agree apparently because
concession-makers run the risk of looking weak or of losing control of negotiations
altogether. One Turkish official recounted a colleague who, returning from a
technical meeting with the Commission, bragged to his seniors in Ankara about his
‘‘victory over the Europeans.’’25 Yet, it is also a cultural fact that ‘‘negotiation’’ and
22 Interview with Commission officials (9 April, May 25, 2009, and June 2, 2009, Brussels).
23 Phone conversation with a Turkish official from the Ministry of Economy (August 2, 2012).
24 Interview with a Commission official from the DG Enlargement (December 18, 2008, Brussels). The
‘‘tomato quotas’’ this official was referring to are export quotas the EU applies to Turkey on tomato paste.
Since 1998, the EU is not allowing Turkey to utilize its 38,400-ton duty-free tomato paste export quota
due to a dispute over duty-free EU meat exports to Turkey. Over quota imports of tomato paste to the EU
are subject to a 15 % tariff. In 2006, the tariff quota for prepared tomato decreased to 8,900 tons in order
for a reduction in the most-favored nation duty to be applied at 100 % (2006/999/EC: Decision No 2/2006
of the EC-Turkey Association Council of October 17, 2006, amending Protocols 1 and 2 to Decision No
1/98 on the trade regime for agricultural products.) The nature of the dispute between Turkey and the EU
over beef and live bovine animals is quite complicated to cover in here.
25 Interview with a Turkish official (May 29, 2009, Brussels).
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‘‘compromise’’ mean different things to officials from different EU member states
(Bellier 2000:67). Such differences in the culture of compromise can make it harder
for the EU institutions themselves to attain a common European interest.
Like the French and Italians, the British Commission interlocutor concluded
Turks use a courtier system rather than a college system. The prime minister is the
sole decider on policy, without resorting much to technocratic expertise. In his
court, no trade-offs exist between ministers and his personal advisers. Due to the
high level of bureaucratic politics, his ministers may propose conflicting arguments
and solutions depending on their institutional needs and demands. In the absence of
a system of compromise, the prime minister decides what needs to be done and who
should do it. Because the lower level bureaucracy has low authority in decision
making—hence heavily depend on higher-level officials’ making of policy
decisions—they appear to act as simple conduits, implementing policies designed,
defined, and decided elsewhere.26 However, unlike the French case, this Commis-
sion interlocutor argued there are no means to balance out the existing courtier
networks surrounding the Turkish prime minister.
Because so few Turkish representatives actively participate in negotiations,
despite their high numbers, Commission officials commonly assume that there is
widespread inertia in the Turkish bureaucracy. Some Turkish bureaucrats agree.
Accordingly, the passive presence of Turkish bureaucrats in meetings with the
Commission could be explained by Turkish bureaucratic culture and how it
responds to power inequities in its EU relations. On the surface, Turkish
bureaucrats’ sheer attendance and non-participation appear as simple ‘‘traditional’’
aspects of the Turkish bureaucratic culture—lack of institutional memory, absence
of accumulation of knowledge, bureaucratic inertia, lack of systems of account-
ability, and power struggles between and within state organs as manifested at the
individual bureaucratic level—all of which has been perfectly summed up by a
Turkish bureaucrat: ‘‘In the Turkish state bureaucracy, one should act to be able to
do something, not to be somebody. But in order to do something, you need to be
somebody.’’27 Lower level bureaucrats may not be as forthcoming with their
opinions despite the fact that they hold necessary technical information, due to a
fear of being sanctioned, one Commission official suggested. They worry that their
comments would be deemed inappropriate by the heads of their unit or by other
seniors in Ankara who may or may not be present at these meetings.28 Surely,
officials from both sides run a critical account of each meeting, and those accounts
get circulated and further circulated, as evidenced in my account above of the
victorious comments of one Turkish public official after a meeting with the
Commission in Brussels. Such representations may ultimately provoke rewards or
26 In another case with an imperial cultural context, Uchiyamada (2004:7) makes a similar point
regarding Japanese officials, who he described as ‘‘beautifully decorated surface matters.’’ He associated
lower level bureaucrats’ acting like ‘‘subalterns, who are not allowed to express their views, [but] are
nevertheless expected to be present to show their corporeal and collective conformity’’ to Japan’s
imperial history and its reflection in Japanese bureaucratic culture.
27 Interview with a Turkish official (May 29, 2009, Brussels). For an ethnographic study of Turkish
bureaucracy from the peripheries of state power, see Alexander (2002).
28 Interview with a Commission official from DG MARKT (June 2, 2009, Brussels).
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sanctions. A Belgian Commission official suggested, however, that once Turkish
bureaucrats at higher levels realize that their position is not under threat, they relax
their authority over lower level officials.29 Others made similar remarks, but a few
also pointed out that aspects of Turkish bureaucratic culture that result in inertia and
other ‘‘bureaucratic abnormalities’’ could also be considered as indicators of the
potential malleability of Turkey’s bureaucracy from an EU perspective. Their
Turkish colleagues who have to work their way through exiting bureaucratic
channels agreed. One Turkish official confidently concluded: ‘‘When something
needs to be done, it gets done!’’30 But how could such malleable bureaucratic
potentialities turn into bureaucratic realities? Any attempt in that regard, it seems,
has to also deal with other aspects of the courtier system that are manifest in extra-
statal spaces of politics and politicking, for example, by economic elites, on which
fresh research is needed.
A more productive way to conceptualize bureaucratic stereotypes is to view them
as ‘‘one of the currencies of social life,’’ as Herzfeld (1992:72) suggests. Following
James Scott, Chalfin (2010:51) argued: ‘‘The state … is a formative space of
sociality … which requires mastery of distinct modes of self-presentation and
communication.’’ Stereotypes provide means for those involved to make sense of
each other. As such, bureaucratic stereotypes such as inertia or the college-courtier
axis ‘‘emerge from situated actors’ relationships with the sources of power’’
(Herzfeld 1992:77). Hence, a more persuasive argument to counterbalance that of
bureaucratic inertia is given by Heyman (2004:489) who argues that, ‘‘the results of
bureaucratic action are not idiosyncrasies or failures but in some way reflections of
the combination of various internal and external power relations surrounding the
organization, often crystallized into patterns of organizational routine.’’ He further
suggested that anthropologists should ‘‘pay particular attention to the way
bureaucrats go about their work, especially in the zone between official policy
and unofficial routine and discretion, as clues to wider political arrangements and
governing ideologies’’ (Heyman 2004:489). From this perspective, I conclude that
Turkish bureaucratic ‘‘inertia’’ is actually a reaction to pressures from interests both
at home and in Europe. When Turkish officials attempt to represent public interests
in technical meetings with the Commission, whether the subject at hand is
individual commodity exports or third-party free trade agreements, they commonly
feel that they cannot say anything definitive to the meeting because those who they
represent back in Turkey are reluctant to give them any definitive instructions
except that ‘‘all is under study.’’31 This kind of foot-dragging also happens on the
EU side, as my earlier discussion on FTA negotiations illustrates, yet when the
Commission does this, it is rarely characterized as ‘‘bureaucratic inertia.’’
29 Interview with a Commission official from DG TRADE (February 4, 2009, Brussels).
30 Interview with a Turkish official (December 10, 2008, Brussels).
31 Interview with a senior-level bureaucrat from Turkey’s Delegation to the EU (December 10, 2008,
Brussels).
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Conclusion: European integration from the margins
This article has moved from the regional aims of the European Union within the
capitalist world-system, to the political and economic processes of accession and
economic integration, to the negotiations that have challenged this process of
integration, and, finally, to the incompatible bureaucratic practices that reinforce
conflicts of economic interests in the very processes of Turkey’s EU integration.
Here, there are two sides, one, a supra-governmental bureaucracy representing (and
monopolizing access to) the full membership of the Union and, the other, a
peripheral nominee for EU accession whose economic interests often come into
conflict with the very people with whom they are negotiating. In such an imbalanced
power situation, it might be no surprise that a proud and postimperial government
such as the Turkish one would try to balance out its power deficit by the simple
method of sending more delegates to meetings than the other side does. But this
does not work the way the Turkish side expects. Congruent with the courtier system,
sending such large delegations only serves to make the Turkish side appear to be
more peripheral and ‘‘old-fashioned’’ in a setting where the EU markets itself as
working largely on the collegial model. As a result, Turkey continues to lose on
important economic matters such as tomato paste export quotas or, more
significantly, the FTAs the EU signs with third countries. The negotiation process
was supposed to move Turkey from limited economic integration to full political
integration in the EU, but instead it lays bare the unequal power relations between
core and periphery, since it reverses the momentum that was supposed to occur with
the outset of the customs union itself.
Crystallized in customs union arrangements in operation for over a decade and a
half now, deeper economic cooperation between the EU and Turkey did not fulfill
Turkish expectations of enhanced political integration with the Union. Decoupled
from a commitment to the country’s EU membership prospect, arguments that are
solely based on economic interests fail to convince both sides about the future
viability of sustaining existing terms and conditions of Turkey’s economic
integration to the Union and its itinerant politics, especially in a context where
those interests are seen to be increasingly competitive. In this study, I argued that
problems in managing the Turkey-EU Customs Union as a macro-template for
advanced economic integration are due to unequal power relations between the
Union and Turkey. The disjuncture in the understanding of overall objectives of
economic integration is also a strong factor. Each of these factors has everyday
ramifications on individual actors; for these actors are increasingly disenfranchised
from day-to-day negotiations. Techno-bureaucrats have historically been the main
engineers and promoters of economic integration in the wider region. But they are
also human beings whose actions and behaviors are both reflections of and
constitutive of the wider political economic realities in which they live and operate.
Despite the Commission’s strong intentions to present the EU-Turkey Customs
Union as a working relationship of economic integration, ethnographic analysis
revealed that at the individual bureaucratic level this relationship is a failed
association because promises of political membership are not fulfilled when the EU
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side stalls the process and the Turkish side fails to deliver reforms in a systematic
way.
Failed promises of common interest formation in economy and politics in the
case of the Turkey-EU Customs Union left officials from both sides feeling that they
had no option but to disengage from mutually sustainable interests. My above
expose´ of this disintegration process indicates that mutually sustainable futures in
the European region between capitalism’s old centers and newly emerging
periphery centers depend on politicians’ and bureaucrats’ working out of their
differences via democratic channels and not on enhanced bureaucratic politicking.
This study aims to be a first step in that long and narrow road, whereby political
economy and its cultural forms are better understood and mutually agreed. In
considering the fate of states and peoples, a customs union, for example, is never
simply a merger of different customs regimes. Tariffs and other customs levies,
once tools of protection for nationally defined economies, have never been simple
technical mechanisms or policies but are ‘‘among the many constituents of the
structure of global economy, along with hierarchy of core and periphery’’
(Roseberry 2002:68). To understand Turkey’s aspirations to become part of the
European core, and the global structural power relations and local bureaucratic
conditions that inhibit it, we must attend to both the political economies and the
cultural settings in which the former turned to be an everyday phenomenon. In an
increasingly globalized world, others such as the ASEAN and the Mercusor take the
EU as a model for successful regional integration. Future studies of the
interrelations between political economic inequalities, interests, and how they play
out in everyday bureaucratic practices will illuminate these interrelated processes in
either the context of regional integration or otherwise.
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